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Policy Brief
How Does Dipping into Your Pension
Affect Your Retirement Wealth?
Gary V. Engelhardt

How Does Dipping into Your Pension
Affect Your Retirement Wealth?
Introduction
Although pensions, both public and private, are intended to
provide income during retirement, a growing number of
American workers receive part or all their employer-provided
pensions in the form of a cash settlement, called a lump-sum
distribution, when they change jobs. They have many choices of
what to do with that money: for example, they can roll it over
into an Individual Retirement Account (IRA), spend the money
or pay off debt, transfer it to the pension plan of a new employer,
or even leave the money with the old employer’s pension plan.
Policymakers are concerned that workers who spend their
pension distributions on current consumption are depriving
themselves of the financial resources they will need for
retirement.
This policy brief describes some results from an ongoing study
on the long-term economic consequences of lump-sum pension
distributions.1 The study uses detailed information on
employment histories, pensions, and wealth from Wave 1 (1992)
of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a nationally
representative survey of individuals between the ages of 51 and
61.
The primary finding is that overall there is little evidence that
dipping into pension funds significantly decreases retirement
wealth, because workers typically consume pension distributions
of relatively small value while preserving large pension
accumulations for retirement. If pension assets that were spent
had been preserved for retirement instead, they would have
represented only about 10 percent of retirement wealth for the
1

Aging Studies Policy Brief

typical household that spent the money. There is, however, a
small group of households who would have benefited greatly if
they had preserved all their pensions. About 2 percent of all
households aged 51 to 61 in 1992 could have increased their
retirement wealth by at least 25 percent if they had not dipped
into their pensions.

Background
Retirement requires individuals to have accumulated
assets to maintain consumption..., income, whether in
the form of state-provided retirement or disability
benefits, private pensions, income from other family
members, or assets. (Costa 1998, pp. 14, 32)
The concept of retirement as a complete, voluntary withdrawal
from the paid labor force is relatively new in this country. Until
well into the nineteenth century, the United States was primarily
a rural, agricultural economy, where family members worked in
and for the family according to their ability—age and health—
throughout their lifetime. Because families derived no benefit
from deliberately idling one of their members, there was virtually
no “unemployment,” and “retirement” was the result of disability,
not choice, among all but the wealthy. As recently as 1880,
nearly 80 percent of men aged 65 and older were gainfully
employed; that is, they claimed to have had an occupation in the
year before the census was taken. By 1990, the proportion of
employed and retirees among older men had flipped: more than
80 percent of men aged 65 and older were retired from the paid
labor force. (For more information about the historical events that
shaped retirement in twentieth century America, see Costa 1998
and Sass 1997.)
Today, most Americans rely on what has commonly been
described as a “three-legged stool”—Social Security, private
pensions, and personal savings—to provide retirement income.
This policy brief uses the broader concept of wealth, the total
accumulation of assets, to measure a household’s retirement
resources.2
2
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Pensions
About half of all private-sector workers participate in a
retirement plan, or pension (US DOL 1999). This policy brief
focuses on the most important type of private pensions, those
provided by firms as a benefit of employment. There are two
types of employer-provided pensions.
The traditional defined benefit (DB) pension dominated the first
three-quarters of the twentieth century. With this type of pension,
benefits are based on a formula that usually involves some
combination of final salary, age, and years of service. DB
pensions were designed in part to encourage a stable, dependable,
immobile workforce that stayed with one employer for a lifetime.
Employees do not contribute to DB plans and, in the past, most
DB plans did not allow employees access to pension funds upon
job change. Federal law now permits these plans to cash out
pension benefits upon job change (or plan termination) if the
benefit amount is less than $5,000.3
Defined contribution (DC) pension plans have grown in
popularity in the last few decades, as the work environment has
moved away from long-term commitments between employer
and employee. With this type of pension, assets accumulate in
individual accounts through contributions by the employer and/or
employee, as well as through interest earnings. Almost all
defined contribution plans allow workers to access their pension
funds upon job change. New federal legislation enables workers
to carry their pensions with them from job to job in many cases.
In 1975, 68 percent of all pension plan participants were enrolled
in only a DB plan, 13 percent were in only a DC plan, and 19
percent were in both types of plans. By 1996, those figures were
19 percent, 50 percent, and 31 percent respectively (US DOL
1999).
The 401(k) plan is a defined contribution plan funded primarily
by voluntary employee contributions. These were first authorized
in 1978 but came into popular use after the IRS issued clarifying
3
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regulations in 1981. Today, 401(k)s are the most common DC
plan, covering over 30 percent of all private wage and salary
workers, and about 65 percent of all pension covered workers
(US DOL 1999).
The federal tax code discourages cash pension settlements before
retirement or disability in several ways. First, pensions enjoy the
benefits of tax deferral. Pension contributions of both employees
and employers are tax-deductible and accrue at the pre-tax
interest rate. As contributions and interest accumulate, they are
not taxed until withdrawal. A worker with access to pension
benefits upon job change who rolls them over into a tax-qualified
plan preserves the tax-favored status of the money. Otherwise, it
is taxed as ordinary income in the year of receipt. Those who
spend their pensions thus forego the benefits of tax deferral. In
addition, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 established a 10 percent
penalty excise tax on distributions to workers under age 55 that
are not rolled into a tax-qualified plan.

The Health and Retirement Survey
Despite incentives to preserve pension assets until retirement,
many workers dip into their pensions. To determine the effect of
such behavior on retirement resources, I have assembled data
from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). The HRS is a
nationally representative survey of individuals between the ages
of 51 and 61. It was first conducted in 1992. A total of 12,652
individuals who comprised 7,607 households were interviewed
that year. These individuals have been re-interviewed every two
years since. Each series of interviews provides detailed
information on employment, income, wealth, health, and
pensions.
As a data source, the HRS has a number of advantages. First, it
contains detailed data on household financial and housing wealth.
Second, the study obtained detailed information from respondents
about private pensions on current and past jobs. Third,
respondents were asked permission to link their survey responses
to administrative earnings histories and benefits records from the
4

Gary V. Engelhardt

Social Security Administration (SSA). With detailed information
on financial, housing, pension, and Social Security wealth, the
HRS is the only household survey to give complete coverage of
the household portfolio. Finally, the survey was well timed. In
1992, the main respondents were centered around that critical age
of 55, after which the law permits pension cashouts without
penalty.
The primary disadvantage is that the HRS only interviewed
individuals between the ages of 51 and 61 in the initial interview
year 1992. This means that the people in this study were born
between 1931 and 1941. This is an important group of
Americans, but they are by no means representative of today’s
American workers. The HRS respondents look more like oldstyle workers. They are more likely to have worked in
manufacturing, to be unionized, and to be covered by defined
benefit plans than today’s workers. Therefore, conclusions drawn
from this group of workers may not apply to other workers. In
particular, younger workers are more likely to have defined
contribution pension plans and, hence, greater access to pension
assets upon job change than the HRS workers did. This is
discussed in more detail in the conclusion.
In the 1992 interview, on which this analysis is based,
respondents were asked retrospective questions about what
happened to pension assets for each important job they had at any
point during their lifetime. A sample of 1,282 households was
drawn; in each of them, a respondent reported both that they had
left a job and had, at least once, received a lump-sum distribution
when they left a job.

What Do Workers Do with Lump-Sum
Distributions?
Table 1 shows the disposition and size of lump-sum pension
distributions for this sample. Column 1, panel A, shows the
percent of all recipients by disposition. Most recipients cashed
out upon job termination. Only 26.7 percent of distributions were
rolled into an IRA or left to accumulate in the employer’s plan.
5
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TABLE 1. Disposition and Size of Lump-Sum Distributions
(1)
(2)
(3)
Mean [Median]
Distribution
Distribution
Recipients
Disposition
( in 1992 dollars)
(percent)
(percent)
A. Individual Uses
Rolled over into another tax26.67
59,136
52.79
qualified plan or left to
[16,584]
accumulate
Transferred to new employer’s
0.61
66,888
1.36
plana
[28,094]
Converted to an annuitya
0.67
39,997
0.90
[38,152]
Cashed out:
67.63
17,753
40.19
[8,920]
Spent
33.62
16,931
19.05
[8,220]
Saved or invested
15.21
25,928
13.20
[13,762]
Paid bills or debts
8.57
12,509
3.59
[7,725]
Other
10.24
12,702
4.35
[6,106]
Other
4.42
32,421
4.76
[23,213]
Total
100.00
29,880
100.00
[11,081]
B. Type of Rollover
Tax-Qualified
27.95
58,843
55.05
[17,458]
Wealth-Preserving
51.72
41,491
71.83
[13,429]
Note: All figures in the table were calculated using the HRS household analysis
weights based on the sample of 1,282 households described in the text. When
weighted, this sample represented 2,713,816 aggregate households. See glossary
for definitions of terms.
aThis category was not listed as a possible response on the questionnaire for those
with non-DC plans.
Source: Author’s calculations.

A total of 67.6 percent of distributions were received as a cash
settlement, on which ordinary income tax and, when appropriate,
penalty were paid. One-half of those who cashed out spent their
distribution, about one-quarter saved or invested, and about oneeighth paid off debt. About one-sixth of those who cashed out
6
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reported “Other” as the use. If one assumes that “Other” indicates
uses that effectively were spending, then 43.9 percent
(33.62+10.24) of all recipients and 64.8 percent (43.9/67.6) of
those who cashed out spent their distributions.
However, to evaluate the long-term effect on retirement wealth, it
is important to know the extent to which cash settlements are put
to “wealth-preserving” uses. The obvious way to preserve wealth
is through a rollover into another tax-qualified pension plan.
However, this definition may be too narrow. For instance,
workers may choose to pay taxes and penalties on a lump-sum
distribution and invest in a non-pension asset (start a business,
buy a house, etc.) or pay off debt. In these cases, cash settlements
represent shifts in the composition of the respondent’s wealth
portfolio, but they do not constitute changes in total wealth.
These funds are preserved (albeit not in pensions) and potentially
could provide for income or a higher standard of living in
retirement.
Naturally, there are a number of caveats that come with this
definition of “wealth preservation.” First, it assumes that the
assets purchased with pension funds will be a good store of value
until retirement (e.g., purchase of a house) and that the debt that
was paid off was incurred in the process of asset acquisition (e.g.,
paying down mortgage debt). But clearly, paying down credit
card debt with pension money is not “wealth preserving.”4
In the analysis that follows, it is not possible to determine
whether dipping into pension money was the only difference
between the two groups. Those who did (“spenders”) may have
been fundamentally different from those who did not (“savers”)
in ways that were not measured. For example, “savers” may have
had better access to credit markets and may have borrowed to
finance their big-ticket purchases, whereas “spenders” may have
had poorer access to credit markets and, hence, used their pension
money as recourse. The economic information in the HRS is the
most detailed to date, but not detailed enough to account for such
differences across households.
7
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Panel B in Table 1 gives summary statistics by the type of
rollover: tax-qualified and wealth preserving. Tax-qualified
rollovers are distributions rolled to another tax-qualified plan,
transferred to a new employer, or converted to an annuity. None
triggers federal income tax or penalties. Wealth-preserving
rollovers include tax-qualified rollovers as well as after-tax cash
settlements that were reported saved or invested, or used to pay
bills or debts. As column 1 shows, only 28 percent of all
recipients had tax-qualified rollovers, but 51.7 percent had wealth
preserving rollovers.
Based on these figures, 23.7 percent of recipients used their aftertax cash settlement to increase assets or reduce debts, and from
panel A, it is clear that most was for asset accumulation. This is
somewhat surprising, because these recipients were required to
pay the penalty tax and income tax on their cash settlements.
Column 2 shows the mean distribution by disposition. The
median, in square brackets, is the value for the middle household,
with one-half of the households in the sample above it and the
other half below. All figures are in real 1992 dollars, deflated by
the Consumer Price Index. In the bottom row in panel A, the
mean and median distributions for all uses were $29,880 and
$11,081, respectively. In comparison, the mean and median
distributions for those recipients who rolled over to an IRA were
significantly larger: $59,136 and $16,584, respectively. All aftertax cash settlements had a mean and median of $17,753 and
$8,920, respectively. Within this category, settlements that were
saved or invested were much larger than those that were spent or
used to pay bills or debts.
Column 3 gives the percent of all distributions by type of
disposition as a measure of incidence. These dollar-weighted
frequencies cast a more favorable picture of the preservation of
pension wealth upon job change. Larger distributions were more
likely to have been saved. In panel B, 55 percent of all
distributions were tax-qualified rollovers, and 71.8 percent were
wealth-preserving rollovers. Therefore, even though only about
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half of the recipients had wealth-preserving rollovers, almost 72
percent of the pre-retirement distribution dollars were saved.

Are “Spenders” Less Wealthy than “Savers”?
One common finding of previous studies in this area is that
individuals who save their pension assets differ at the time of job
change from those who spend them. In particular, “spenders”
tend to be younger, less educated, earn less, and have shorter job
tenure and smaller pension accumulations. Unfortunately, the
HRS did not ask retrospective questions about personal wealth at
the time of job change, so we do not know if “spenders” were
systematically less wealthy than “savers” at that time. However,
the HRS did ask about personal wealth in 1992, so we can answer
a related question: whether those who spent distributions in the
past are currently less wealthy (i.e., in 1992) than those who
saved their pension assets.
Panel A of Table 2 shows the mean current wealth of households
who ever spent a pension distribution versus those who saved all
distributions. Medians are in square brackets.5 Surprisingly,
spenders had more current pension wealth than savers: about
$8,900 and $4,200 more at the mean and median, respectively.
However, these differences were not statistically significant.6
A unique feature of the HRS is that respondents were asked
permission to link their survey responses to administrative
earnings histories and benefits records from the Social Security
Administration. This has allowed for the construction of Social
Security wealth for each survey household.7 Spenders have about
$12,000 and $7,000 less in Social Security wealth than savers at
the mean and median, respectively. Both differences are
statistically significant. However, when retirement resources are
measured as the sum of current pension and Social Security
wealth, there is no statistically significant difference between the
groups.

9
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TABLE 2. Mean and Median Wealth and Lifetime Earnings for Households that Spent
versus Saved Lump-Sum Distributions (in 1992 dollars)
(1)
(2)
All Households (n=1,282)
Spent Any
Distributions
Saved All Distributions
Variable
(n=659)
(n=623)
A. Measure of Wealth
Non-Housing Wealth
96,173
87,237
[22,853]
[18,623]
Pension Wealth
17,341*
47,770
IRA and Keogh Wealth
[0]*
[12,000]
113,604
135,007
Pension, IRA, and Keogh Wealth
[42,114]*
[58,959]
143,544*
155,415
[137,097]*
[161,011]
Social Security Wealth
Pension and Social Security
239,717
246,114
Wealth
[186,747]
[194,077]
Pension, IRA, Keogh and Social
257,148*
296,033
Security Wealth
[200,339]*
[225,064]
156,511
216,763
Other Non-Housing Wealth
[41,000]*
[54,000]
63,647
78,855
[50,000]
[57,000]
Housing Wealth
477,306*
605,570
[342,897]*
[405,817]
Total Wealth
B. Measure of Lifetime Earnings
Social Security Average Indexed
2,345*
2,577
Monthly Earnings (AIME)
[2,360]*
[2,650]
Note: Medians in square brackets. An asterisk indicates a statistical significant
difference between the figures in columns (1) and (2) at the 5 percent level. All figures
were calculated using the HRS household analysis weights. When weighted, the
subgroup of 659 represented 1,556,433 aggregate households and the subgroup of
623 represented 1,525,737 aggregate households. See glossary for definitions of
terms..
Source: Author’s calculations.

The differences in mean and median non-housing wealth are
large, about $60,000 and $13,000, respectively, and statistically
significant. In contrast, the two groups look similar in terms of
housing wealth. The differences in housing wealth are
economically small. The last measure in panel A is total wealth,
defined as the sum of Social Security, pension, non-housing, and
10
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housing wealth. Overall, spenders are substantially less wealthy
than savers. Even measured by the median, households that spent
distributions have about $62,000 less in wealth than households
that saved distributions.
Panel B compares the lifetime earnings of the two groups
measured by the Social Security Administration’s Average
Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME, which equals the average of a
person’s highest 35 years of income). Households that spent
distributions had lower AIME by $232 and $290 per month, or
$2,784 and $3,480 per year, at the mean and median,
respectively. These differences are statistically significant and
economically important.

How Much More Would “Spenders” Have Available
for Retirement?
How much more in retirement resources would households that
dipped into their pension assets have had had they instead saved
that money? To quantify this, I define PVS, the household’s
“present value of spent lump-sum distributions.” It is the amount
of wealth that all spent lump-sum distributions would have grown
to today had they been rolled over to a tax-qualified plan and
invested rather than cashed out and spent. The “present” is 1992.
Specifically, for unmarried individuals in the sample, PVS was
calculated as follows. First, for each past job with a spent
distribution, the present investment value of that distribution was
calculated. This required knowing the year and amount of the
distribution (given in the HRS) and the periodic real rate of
return. Based on historical returns in Ibbotson Associates (1997),
annual real rates of return were calculated for three investment
strategies: 100 percent investment in corporate bonds; 50 percent
in corporate bonds and 50 percent in stocks; and, 100 percent in
stocks. For married couples, PVS was calculated for the
individual and spouse and then summed.
Table 3 gives the distribution of PVS for the sub-sample of 659
households in the 1992 HRS with a member who spent at least
one pre-retirement lump-sum distribution. The figures in columns
11
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1-3 reflect the three assumptions about the investment mix just
outlined. The mean present value of spent lump-sum distributions
was $37,002 if invested solely in bonds. With a higher risk-return
investment strategy of 100 percent stocks, this increased to
$54,643. Like other measures of wealth, PVS is right-skewed
(because very wealthy people raise the mean) and the mean
greatly exceeds the median. At the median, PVS was $17,065 and
$23,167 if invested all in bonds and all in stocks, respectively.
TABLE 3. The Present Value of Spent Lump-Sum Distributions and Pension Wealth, 1992 Dollars
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Present Value of Spent Lump-Sum Distributions
(1992 dollars)
Current
Pension
Counterfactual
100%
50%/50%
Percentile
Wealth
Pension Wealth
Bonds
Bonds/Stocks
100% Stocks
10th
2,583
2,994
2,994
0
7,746
25th
5,714
7,042
7,874
0
22,924
50th
17,065
21,125
23,167
22,853
77,921
75th
42,857
49,339
56,824
119,247
173,009
90th
79,692
100,923
120,748
290,063
350,588
Mean
37,002
45,807
54,643
96,173
141,981
Note: All figures were calculated using the HRS household analysis weights. These statistics were
calculated on the subsample of 659 HRS households that ever spent a lump-sum distribution. When
weighted, this subsample represented 1,556,433 aggregate households. A total of 69 percent of these
households had positive current pension wealth in 1992 and 31 percent had no current pension
wealth. Counterfactual pension wealth in column (5) is the sum of actual pension wealth and the
present value of spent lump-sum distributions assuming an investment mix of 5 percent bonds and 50
percent stocks. It represents the pension wealth the household would have had had it not spent past
distributions. See glossary for definitions of other terms.

Column 4 gives the distribution of current pension wealth. Mean
and median current pension wealth were $96,173 and $22,853,
respectively. In addition, column 5 displays “counterfactual”
pension wealth. This is sum of current pension wealth and the
present value of spent distributions with an investment mix of 50
percent bonds and stocks, respectively. It represents the pension
wealth the household would have had currently had it not spent
any past distributions and instead rolled them over. Mean and
median counterfactual pension wealth were $141,981 and
$77,921, respectively.8 Measured in absolute terms, it is clear that
pension wealth would have been significantly higher for some
households had distributions been rolled over.
To determine whether these absolute amounts would have
supplemented actual retirement resources significantly, they
12
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should be compared to broader measures of household wealth.
Therefore, the relative importance of erosion is measured as
PVS
,
W

where the denominator, W, is a measure of the household’s
retirement wealth.
TABLE 4. The Present Value of Spent Lump-Sum Distributions as a Percentage of
Broader Measures of Wealth

Percentile

(1)
100% Bonds

(2)
50/50 Bonds/Stocks

(3)
100% Stocks

A. As a Percentage of Social Security and Pension Wealth
10th
25th
50th
75th
90th

1.16
2.87
8.13
23.73
58.91

1.27
3.53
9.73
27.25
65.30

1.37
3.80
11.17
32.06
74.50

B. As a Percentage of Social Security, Pension, and Non-Housing Wealth
10th
25th
50th
75th
90th

0.69
1.91
5.36
14.91
37.72

0.81
2.28
6.42
17.94
44.29

0.97
2.54
7.27
20.47
50.72

C. As a Percentage of Total Wealth
0.63
0.71
0.79
10th
25th
1.62
1.93
2.17
4.52
5.24
6.43
50th
75th
12.53
14.99
17.06
28.64
35.38
41.15
90th
Note: All figures are percentages and were calculated using the HRS household
analysis weights. These statistics were calculated on the subsample of 659 HRS
households that ever spent a lump-sum distribution. When weighted, this
subsample represented 1,556,433 aggregate households. See glossary for
definitions of terms.

Table 4 compares PVS relative to three broader measures of
household wealth. The first, in panel A, is the sum of current
pension and Social Security wealth. Erosion is modest because
spenders had significant Social Security wealth (as shown in
Table 5). The median household could have increased its
retirement wealth by 8 to 11 percent had it rolled over. However,
13
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for a small fraction of households, having saved the distribution
would have significantly increased resources for retirement. For
example, 25 percent of the households would have had at least
25 percent more in retirement wealth, and 10 percent of
households would have had at least 59 percent more.
Because households could have saved for retirement outside of
public and private pensions, panel B uses the sum of Social
Security, pension, and non-housing wealth as a measure of
retirement wealth. Importantly, non-housing wealth includes IRA
and Keogh wealth, which could be significant sources of
retirement income. By this metric, spent distributions become
less important. The median household with a spent distribution
could have increased its retirement wealth by about 6 percent had
it rolled over the distributions. One-quarter of the households
would have had at least 15 percent more in retirement wealth, and
one-tenth would have had at least 38 percent more.
Finally, because, in principle, housing equity can provide
resources for retirement, panel C uses total wealth (the sum of
Social Security, pension, non-housing, and housing wealth) as a
measure of retirement wealth. By this metric, spent distributions
become even less important. The median household with a spent
distribution could have increased its retirement wealth by about
5 percent had it rolled over the distributions. One-quarter of the
households would have had at least 12 percent more in retirement
wealth, and one-tenth would have had at least 29 percent or more.
Overall, Table 4 suggests consumed distributions did not result in
significant erosion of retirement resources broadly measured for
the great majority of households that spent their distributions.
However, because of heterogeneity among those that spent
distributions, there is a small group of households that could have
raised their retirement resources substantially (those in the 75th
percentile and higher in Table 4) had they rolled over. However,
it should be emphasized that this subgroup represents only
2.25 percent of all households between the ages of 51 and 61.

14
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TABLE 5. The Present Value of Spent Lump-Sum Distributions as a Percentage of Wealth, by Race and
Education
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
Investment: 50% bonds, 50% Stocks
Race
Education
High
High
School
School
Some
Bachelor’s
More than
Percentile
White
Nonwhite
Dropout
Diploma
College
Degree
College
A. As a Percentage of Social Security and Pension Wealth
25th
50th
75th

3.54
9.73
26.47

3.63
9.87
33.76

2.68
6.60
15.32

2.56
8.91
23.95

3.55
9.49
29.06

4.48
12.45
36.11

6.97
20.20
32.47

2.66
5.32
18.76

3.48
10.32
21.48

B. As a Percentage of Social Security, Pension, and Non-Housing Wealth
25th
50th
75th

2.18
6.21
17.74

2.64
8.13
22.46

2.06
5.30
13.60

1.94
6.21
16.16

2.27
6.61
20.85

C. As a Percentage of Total Wealth
1.88
2.21
1.86
1.76
1.96
2.36
2.71
25th
50th
5.19
7.30
4.78
5.19
5.42
4.75
9.80
14.41
20.38
11.03
12.96
17.23
16.77
18.25
75th
Note: All figures are percentages and were calculated using the HRS household analysis weights. These
statistics were calculated on the subsample of 659 HRS households that ever spent a lump-sum distribution.
When weighted, this subsample represented 1,556,433 aggregate households. Race and education are that of
the individual in the household who received the lump-sum distribution that was spent. If more than one
member of the household ever spent a distribution, then the race and education are that of the individual
designated the HRS primary respondent. See glossary for definitions of other terms.

Table 5 repeats the tabulations in Table 4 by race and education
categories for an investment mix of 50 percent bonds and stocks,
respectively. Measured in terms of current pension and Social
Security wealth (panel A), there was little difference in erosion
by race. When wealth was measured more broadly, as in panels B
and C, nonwhites had slightly greater erosion than whites. For
example, in panel B, columns 1 and 2, the median white
household with a spent distribution could have improved
retirement resources (excluding housing) by 6.2 percent, whereas
the median nonwhite household could have improved by
8.1 percent.
Erosion rose with educational attainment (columns 3-7). For
example, in panel A, the median high-school-dropout household
with a spent distribution could have improved retirement
resources by 6.6 percent compared to 12.5 percent for the median
bachelor’s-degree household, and 20.2 percent for the median
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more than college household. Erosion was greatest for the most
educated.

Conclusion
The primary finding is that overall there is little evidence that
dipping into pension funds significantly decreases retirement
wealth, because workers in the sample typically consumed
pension distributions of relatively small value while they
preserved large pension accumulations for retirement. If pension
assets that were spent instead had been preserved for retirement,
they would have represented about 10 percent of retirement
wealth for the typical household that spent the money. However,
there is a small group of households that would have benefited
greatly if they had not dipped into their pensions. About 2 percent
of all respondents between the ages of 51 and 61 in 1992 could
have increased their household retirement wealth by at least
25 percent had they not dipped into their pensions. This suggests
that proposed policy mechanisms that would enforce pension
rollovers may not raise the retirement income security of the
average American household, but could provide some protection
for a limited number of households.
There is an important caveat to these findings. This study was
based on a national sample of individuals 51 to 61 years old in
1992. These data have significant advantages over those used in
previous studies. However, resulting policy statements are most
accurately applied to individuals and households of roughly the
same age. If younger individuals have different attitudes toward
saving, view pension assets as less dedicated toward retirement,
or have greater access to funds, then this analysis may
underestimate the erosion to retirement income security for
younger workers.9
This policy brief briefly describes what I believe to be a crucial
step in formulating a model of the long-run implications of lumpsum distributions on the adequacy of retirement income benefits.
Such a model should be the ultimate goal of this line of research.
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Endnotes

1. A complete, detailed analysis can be found in Engelhardt
(2001).
2. “A household’s economic well-being depends on both its
income and its asset accumulation, often referred to as its wealth.
While income is the flow of resources to a household, wealth is
the level of resources at any point in time. Wealth, also called net
worth, is a particularly important dimension of well-being for
some subgroups of the population such as the elderly, who tend
to have lower retirement incomes but higher asset holdings”
(Eller and Fraser 1995, p. 1).
3. Under current law, plans may automatically distribute the
account balance of any employee who terminates with a
retirement plan balance of $5,000 or less. Such forced
distributions may generally be rolled over and the plan
administrator must provide a written notice of this and the related
tax consequences before making the distribution. The new law
[the Economic Growth and Tax Reconciliation Act of 2001 (P.L.
107-16), recently signed by President Bush] requires that for
forced distributions greater than $1,000, a direct rollover to an
IRA designated by the current plan administrator will be made,
unless the participant affirmatively elects otherwise. This will go
into effect as soon as the Department of Labor issues final
regulations interpreting the automatic rollover provision, and the
DOL must issue such regulations within three years (TIAACREF 2001). This appears to be an effort to reduce consumption
of small lump-sum distributions.
4. This is especially the case for any borrowing done in
anticipation of getting access to pension money. If an individual
took a vacation after leaving a job and paid for it from pension
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money, then that money is considered spent under the definition
above. However, if the same individual borrowed (say, on a
credit card) to pay for the vacation in anticipation of access to the
pension money, and then subsequently used the pension money to
pay off the credit card debt, then the money is considered
preserved under the above definition. Both scenarios have the
same economic consequences, but are measured differently.
Unfortunately, the questions asked in the HRS were not detailed
enough to separate out these two different scenarios.
5. Technically, pension wealth is defined in Table 2 as the
present value (in 1992) of the household’s claims to assets in
defined benefit and defined contribution plans and the present
value of any annuitized pensions. It does not include the value of
any lump-sum distributions that were rolled into an IRA. It was
calculated by Venti and Wise (2000).
6. Technically, statistical significance is defined at the
5 percent level here.
7. Technically, the measure used came from two sources. For
individuals with matched Social Security earnings histories,
Social Security wealth came from the restricted access Earnings
and Benefits File (EBF) for the 1992 HRS (Wave 1) from the
Institute for Social Research at the University of Michigan. The
calculation of Social Security wealth in the EBF is described in
Mitchell, Olson, and Steinmeier (1996). For individuals without
matched Social Security earnings histories, Social Security
wealth was imputed using self-reported information on earnings
histories in the 1992 and 1996 HRS (Waves 1 and 3) following
the method in Gustman and Steinmeier (1999).
8. The means in columns 2 and 4 sum to that in column 5. But
because the median of a sum is not necessarily the sum of the
medians, the median in column 5 is not the sum of the medians in
columns 2 and 4; this is true for the other percentiles shown as
well.
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9. For example, when offered a 401(k) plan, younger workers
are far less likely to participate than older workers. This has led
to a decrease in overall pension coverage among younger
workers. For fulltime workers under age 25, the pension coverage
rate decreased from 31 percent in 1972 to 21 percent in 1993.
Among workers age 55 to 59 the coverage rate increased from
53 percent in 1972 to 59 percent in 1993 (US DOL 1999).

Glossary
Annuity: A contract by which an insurance company agrees to make regular
payments to someone for life or for a fixed period. Fixed Annuity: A
traditional insurance investment vehicle, often used for retirement accounts,
that guarantees principal and a specified interest rate and may also offer
dividends. Variable Annuity: An annuity, the value of which fluctuates based
on the market performance of an underlying securities portfolio. Unlike fixed
annuities, there is no guarantee of principal or rate of return.
Average Indexed Monthly Earnings (AIME): The average of an
individual’s 35 highest yearly earnings—used in calculating the monthly
benefit at Social Security’s full retirement age.
Defined Benefit Plan: In a defined benefit plan, each employee's future
benefit is determined by a specific formula, and the plan provides a guaranteed
level of benefits on retirement. A private defined benefit plan is typically not
contributory—there are usually no employee contributions, no individual
accounts are maintained for each employee. The employer makes regular
contributions to the entire plan to fund the future benefits of the entire cohort
of participants. The employer bears the risk associated with providing the
guaranteed level of retirement benefits. Usually, the promised benefit is tied to
the employee's earnings, length of service, or both. (This and several other
definitions in this glossary are from The American Savings Education Council
Web site <http://www.asec.org/terms.htm>. ASEC is part of the Employee
Benefit Research Institute Education and Research Fund, a 501(c)(3) nonprofit charitable organization.)
Defined Contribution Plan: In a defined contribution plan, employers
generally promise to make annual or periodic contributions to accounts that
are set up for each employee. Sometimes there are only employer
contributions, sometimes only employee contributions, and sometimes both.
The current contribution is guaranteed but the level of benefits at retirement is
not. The benefit payable at retirement is based on money accumulated in each
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employee's account. The final retirement amount reflects the total of employer
contributions, any employee contributions, and investment gains or losses.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA): ERISA
was designed to secure the benefits of participants in private pension plans
through participation, vesting, funding, reporting, and disclosure rules and the
creation of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. ERISA provided added
pension incentives for the self-employed through changes in Keoghs and for
persons not covered by pensions through individual retirement accounts
(IRAs). It established requirements for plan implementation and operation.
401(k) Plan: A cash or deferred arrangement (CODA) that lets an employee
contribute pretax dollars to a company investment vehicle until the employee
retires or leaves the company.
403(b) Plan: Similar to a 401(k), a cash or deferred arrangement (CODA)
that lets an employee of a tax-exempt education or research organization or
public school contribute pretax dollars to an investment pool until the
employee retires or terminates employment.
Individual Retirement Account (IRA): An IRA provides individuals an
opportunity to save for retirement on a tax-deferred basis. Individuals may
contribute up to $2,000 per year in an individual account; for spousal accounts
the limits are $4,000 if both spouses work and $2,250 if one spouse works.
The amount that is tax deductible varies according to an individual's pension
coverage, income tax filing status, and adjusted gross income. Account
balances distributed from one IRA or from a qualified retirement plan may be
rolled over to another IRA.
Keogh Plan: A Keogh plan is a qualified retirement plan for self-employed
individuals and their employees to which tax-deductible contributions up to a
specified yearly limit can be made if the plan meets certain requirements of the
Internal Revenue Code. Keogh plans, also called H.R. 10 plans, may be
defined benefit or defined contribution plans.
Lump-Sum Distribution: Under a qualified retirement plan, the distribution
of a participant's entire account balance (under a defined contribution plan) or
of the entire value of a participant's accrued benefit (under a defined benefit
plan) as a single cash payment to the participant (or, under certain
circumstances, to another designated party). The availability and payment of
lump-sum distributions are subject to certain legal restrictions, and premature
receipt of such distributions can have adverse tax consequences. The term
present value of spent lump-sum distributions as used in this Policy Brief is
described in the text and uses historical returns from Ibbotson Associates
(1997).
Pension: A series of periodic payments, usually for life, payable monthly or
at other specified intervals. The term is frequently used to describe the part of
a retirement allowance financed by employer contributions. A pension plan is
a plan that provides benefits, after retirement, from a trust or other separately
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maintained fund, by the purchase of insurance, or from general assets
(unfunded plan). The amount of benefits is either specified or can be
calculated in accordance with a set formula based on various factors such as
age, earnings and service, but not profits. The amount of annual contributions
needed to provide the specified benefits can be estimated actuarially and does
not depend upon profits (IFEBP 2000). Pension wealth is the household’s
present value of claims to pension assets in 1992, based on self-reported
pension data, and is taken from Venti and Wise (2000).
Rollover: An employee's transfer of retirement funds from one retirement
plan to another plan of the same type or to an IRA without incurring a tax
liability. The transfer must be made within 60 days of receiving a cash
distribution. The law requires 20 percent federal income tax withholding on
money eligible for rollover if it is not moved directly to the second plan or an
investment company.
Salary Reduction Plan (Cash or Deferred Arrangement (CODA)): A
CODA is a defined contribution plan that allows participants to have a portion
of their compensation (otherwise payable in cash) contributed pre-tax to a
retirement account on their behalf. The following are types of CODA plans
named after the section of the Internal Revenue Code that establishes the rules
for the plan. 401(k) - CODA plan for the for-profit sector of private industry.
403(b) - CODA plan for the not-for-profit sector of private industry. 457 CODA plan for state and local governments.
Savings or Thrift Plan: A defined contribution plan in which participants
make contributions on a discretionary basis with limits and to which
employers may also contribute, usually on the basis of fully or partially
matching participants' contributions. Contributions are commonly made with
after-tax earnings.
Tax Deferral: Postponing taxes due on an amount invested and/or its
earnings until they are withdrawn from the investment.
Tax Qualified Plan: Often used to refer to plans established under sections
401(k), 401(a), or 403(a) of the Internal Revenue Code. More commonly, any
retirement plan that meets IRS criteria that allow employers to deduct pension
costs as a business expense and defer current income tax on its earnings and
allow employees to defer income tax on the employer's contributions and
earnings.
Wealth: All goods and resources having value in terms of exchange or use
(American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language, 3rd edition). Several
categories of wealth are used in this Policy Brief. Pension wealth is the
household’s present value of claims to pension assets in 1992, based on selfreported pension data, and is taken from Venti and Wise (2000). Other nonhousing wealth includes non-pension, non-housing wealth in forms other than
IRAs and Keoghs. Social Security wealth is the household’s expected present
value of claims to Social Security in 1992 and is taken from the HRS Social
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Security Earnings and Benefits File and from Gustman and Steinmeier (1998)
as described in the text. Total wealth is the sum of pension, Social Security,
IRA, Keogh, other non-housing, and housing wealth.
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